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The PRIME project demonstrates the viability of privacy-enhancing identity management. By this 
we mean identity management solutions that manage the individual's identity online and that also 
empower the individual to actively protect their own privacy.
The guiding principle in the PRIME project is to put individuals in control of their personal data. The 
notion of user control has been adopted in many recent user-centric identity management initia-
tives. 
However, most of these initiatives only takes the first steps on the way to a new generation of iden-
tity management systems. They do not provide adequate safeguards for personal data and are 
limited in giving individuals control over their personal data. Effective management of information 
privacy requires new tools starting with the minimisation of personal data disclosure. Furthermore, 
users can be empowered with tools that allow them to negotiate privacy policies with service pro-
viders. This would require systems that enforce agreed policies by technical means, and keep 
track of data collection and usage. In addition to user side applications, service providers will be 
required to put adequate protection mechanisms in place and align business processes to take 
advantage of these mechanisms.
This white paper describes our vision of privacy-enhancing identity management and how it can be 





The PRIME project is a 
research project that 
aims to demonstrate 
viable solutions to 
privacy-enhancing 
identity management 




lines, protocols and 
prototype implementa-
tions that are evaluated 
from a multidisciplinary 
perspective. The proto-
types are not intended 
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The internet, by design, lacks unified provisions for identifying who communicates with whom; it 
lacks a well-designed identity infrastructure.1 Instead, technology designers, enterprises, govern-
ments and individuals have over time developed a bricolage of isolated, incompatible, partial solu-
tions to meet their needs in communications and transactions. The overall result of these unguided 
developments is that enterprises and governments cannot easily identify their communication part-
ners at the individual level. Given the lack of a proper identity infrastructure, individuals often have to 
disclose more personal data than strictly required. In addition to name and address contact details 
such as multiple phone numbers (home, work, mobile) and e-mail addresses are requested. The 
amount and nature of the data disclosed exceeds that usually required of real world transactions, 
which can often be conducted anonymously – in many cases the service could be provided without 
any personal data at all. Over the long run, the inadequacy of the identity infrastructure, that takes 
the above into account, affects individuals' privacy. The availability of abundant personal data to 
enterprises and governments has a profound impact on the individual's right to be let alone as well 
as on society at large. 
The online world is a complex new environment. Social structures online have to be established 
within a short time - very much unlike their real world counterparts. At first glance those procedures 
based on personal contact or paper are transformed into digital procedures for use online. But be-
low the surface, more fundamental differences between the offline and the online world exist, such 
as the relative permanence of memories and the ease with which experiences can be shared be-
tween many of actors across time and space barriers. 
We are beginning to understand that these differences are both qualitative (e.g., automated deci-
sion making) and quantitative (e.g., more data collected and stored for a longer period) in nature. 
The speed of developments and potential irreversibility of their effects requires urgent attention on 
issues such as identity, trust, security, and privacy. 
The – sometimes conflicting – interests and issues that have to be reconciled are increasingly well 
understood. For example for such a conflict is an interest in identifying trading parties on one hand 
and providing anonymity on the other. The convenience of 'portable' online identities is another 
example; users do not want to fill in similar forms for each service, yet there is the risk of disclosing 
more than is required. National security interests – sometimes positioned as overriding civil liberties 
in public debates – increases the need for proper data protection. And finally, while customer data 
is an important business asset, they can become a business liability in complying with data protec-
tion legislation.2
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1  The Internet has a ID infrastructure often identifying only the endpoint of a communication: IP addresses. 
These are often unreliable to identify users. 
2  This is particularly so in several States in the US, where security and privacy breaches have to be reported 




esses that manage and 
control who has ac-
cess to resources, and 
what each user is enti-
tled to do with those 
resources, in compli-
ance with the organisa-
tions' policies.
 ⎋
Online identity management ⎋ is in need of reconsideration. The patchwork approach to online 
identity needs to make way for a more elaborate design that takes into account the various stakes 
and issues. Indeed the identity management landscape appears to be changing. Enterprise iden-
tity management ⎋ is slowly making way for user-centric identity management ⎋. Various 
initiatives, such as the Liberty Alliance project and WS-Federation, aim to pave the way for identity 
management that 'involves the users in the management of their personal information and how that 
information is used, rather than to presume that an enterprise or commercial entity holds all the 
data.' [Liberty Alliance 2006]. Establishing authenticated individual identities within and across or-
ganisational boundaries are the primary business drivers behind these initiatives. Their successful 
adoption depends on improved privacy protection. User control and other elements of privacy pro-
tection also gain attention in a broader sense. The '7 laws of identity' [Cameron 2005] initiated by 
Microsoft's Kim Cameron clearly attracted attention in the identity community. 
What these developments show is that industry is adopting the notion of user control over personal 
data. But so far the interests of the service providers are better served than those of the individuals. 
In the wake of what is coined Web 2.0, where consumers merge into prosumers, services replace 
applications, data increasingly drives economic activity, and where generally the landscape be-
comes more dynamic, this will not do. Individuals will feel a stronger desire for privacy and control 
over what‘s known about them. They also require more security, which demands stronger and bet-
ter authentication and identification, which in turn requires even better privacy protection. 
The PRIME project aims to show that seemingly disparate notions such as anonymity and account-
ability, security and privacy, and informational self determination and enterprise needs can be rec-
onciled. PRIME intends to set the boundaries for the emerging identity management infrastructure 
with a clear balance of the interests of users, enterprises and society.
document purpose and scope
This white paper provides an overview of the PRIME consortium's vision on privacy-enhancing 
identity management and illustrates a number of high level requirements incorporated in the PRIME 
software architecture. The document is intended for the architects of the new identity infrastruc-
tures, including information architects, systems designers, corporate decision makers and policy 
makers.
Numerous identity management white papers have been written by technology solutions vendors 
from the perspective of the enterprise. These white papers target corporate decision makers' con-
cerns about financial compliance and return on investment.
The PRIME project takes the perspective of the individual and places the individual at the core of 
user-centric privacy-enhancing identity management. This leads to a different, but not incompatible, 
set of requirements. The requirements elicited in this document have their roots in the OECD Pri-
vacy Guidelines [OECD 1980], the Council of Europe‘s Convetion  No. 108 [CoE 1981], the Fair 
Information Practices (for instance embedded in the CSA privacy code [CSA 1996]), the EU Data 
Protection Directive (Directive 95/46 EC) and recent discussions on user-centric identity manage-
ment. Many of these requirements are discussed in Kim Cameron's '7 Laws of Identity' [Cameron 
2005] and the Ontario Information and Privacy Officer's white paper on identity management [Ca-
voukian 2006].
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federated IDM
A relationship that 
allows the authentica-
tion of an entity verified 
by one identity author-
ity to be recognised by 
other identity authori-
ties in the federation 
[ISO/IEC 2005].





stood as idm that pri-
marily serves the en-
terprise's needs. Con-
trol is exercised by the 
enterprise instead of by 




A form of software 
authentication that 
enables a user to 
authenticate once and 
gain access to the 




agree on rough defini-
tions of the concept, 
yet a common precise 
definition is lacking. In 
this paper it is idm that 
seeks to place admini-
stration and control of 
identity information 








The requirements elicited in the following pages 
may appear to be ambitious, but software proto-
types that demonstrates these features have 
been developed and evaluated within the PRIME 
project. 
Before looking at them in more detail and describ-
ing the PRIME approach to address them, we will 
first take a walkthrough current practice and the 
problems it entails in a typical online shopping 
scenario. The purpose here is to showcase the 
software architecture required for enabling 
privacy-enhancing identity management to those 
organizations interested in deploying these fea-
tures.
Figure 1 illustrates the exchange of personal data 
in a typical online shopping scenario today. Alice 
asks her sister Alicia, whom she dearly trusts, for 
advice on white wine. On the basis of her sister's recommendation, she 
orders a box of bottles of Chardonnay at CyberWinery. To this end, Alice 
has to provide personal data (name, delivery address, and possibly pay-
ment data, such as her credit card data). If this is her first and only order, 
the winery will store only some of these data in their records. But more 
likely, it will ask Alice to register, arguing that this will make it easier for 
her to make additional purchases. If she does, Alice will have an account 
at the winery which not only contains her name and address, but also 
her purchase history, personal preferences, and likely also her credit card 
data. 
Suppose the winery has outsourced warehousing and delivery to Logis-
ticsProvider, a major logistics company. LogisticsProvider needs to have 
some of Alice's personal data – name and shipping address – to deliver 
her order. CyberWinery checks Alice's credit card details at Credit-
Processor for credit authorisation. If the order is accepted, CreditProces-
sor also takes care of processing the payment. Again, Alice's personal 
data are exchanged between two businesses. CreditProcessor will store 
transaction details in their records for business and accountancy pur-
poses. 
Suppose Alice also takes up Alicia's recommendation to purchase the 
Ultimate Wine Guide at CyberBooks, the online bookstore for Gourmet 
PRIME – Privacy and Identity Management for Europe
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Figure 1: user data exchange
issues involved
web forms: Each service provider uses its own 
registration and data entry forms. Form fillers can 
provide some support, but overall the process of 
registering at different service providers is tedious 
and redundant.
consent: The user has to provide the data asked for 
(or fake it) and has no choice but to accept the 
privacy conditions set by the service provider if she 
wants to enter into a contract with this provider. Does 
this 'take it or leave it' approach really reflect the idea 
of user consent? 
excessive data disclosure: More data than 
required for the transaction itself are often collected 
for the sake of establishing trust in the user, and for 
being able to address her for different purposes, 
such as direct marketing or safety alerts. But is the 
service provider really ever going to call the customer 
if they also have her e-mail address?
assurances: The user has to provide data that, 
when leaked to unauthorised persons, can have 
serious implications. How can the user, apart from 
the lock icon in her web browser, be sure the 
systems and communication are trustworthy? How 
can she be sure the provided SSL credentials are 
trustworthy? 
books. She again has to register before being able to order, and she 
basically has to provide the same information she provided to CyberWin-
ery. Consequently, the CyberWinery scenario unfolds again, most likely 
involving CreditProcessor, and possibly even involving LogisticsProvider 
as well. 
The scenario sketched encompasses many exchanges involving per-
sonal data between user and service provider and between service pro-
vider and their associates. Many of these data are stored in multiple da-
tabases. Some providers can make interesting inferences on the basis of 
the data they have. CreditProcessor, for instance, knows where Alice 
does her shopping and the amount she spends, whereas LogisticsPro-
vider even knows what she buys and where. CyberBooks has a much 
dimmer picture of Alice's shopping habits, they only get to see what they 
contribute to Alice's collection of cook books.
Overall, this scenario illustrates a number of issues from a user‘s per-
spective, especially if she wants to minimise the risk that her data may be 
abused, for instance for ID fraud, or for profiling and social sorting ⎋. 
Many of these problems can be addressed by means of novel identity 
management systems. In this paper we discuss various problems and 
describe the way the PRIME project aims to resolve them by offering a 
privacy-enhancing identity infrastructure. We will use Alice's online shop-
ping scenario to unravel the problems and formulate a list of require-
ments on our way. 
PRIME enabled shopping
The aim of the PRIME project is to provide privacy-enhancing identity management tools for indi-
viduals. PRIME empowers the user by offering them more extensive (user) control ⎈ over their 
personal data. The PRIME toolbox ⎋ offers support for creating, using and keeping track of mul-
tiple digital identities and the (certified) attributes associated with them. It allows (certified) attributes 
to be transferred between entities, such as user and service provider, or between service providers. 
It also extends the user's control over attributes disclosed to remote entities. The PRIME vision is 
based on the principle of data minimisation, i.e., disclosing and processing personal data only to 
the extent necessary. To limit the transfer of personal data for authentication purposes, claims and 
credentials are used to establish trustworthy relationships. Where necessary, for instance for certify-
ing certain user attributes, PRIME makes use of privacy-enhancing public key infrastructures and 
trusted third parties. The integrity of claims in PRIME enabled communication is guaranteed by 
cryptographic tech-
niques. Each party in the 
interaction makes use of 
PRIME Middleware ⎋. 
The individual users addi-
tionally use the PRIME 
Console ⎋ to manage 
their personal data. User 
applications (such as 
web browsers) may 
delegate identity man-
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transaction history: Users currently do not have 
reliable digital receipts for online purchases and other 
(trans)actions. This makes it difficult for them to dis-
pute errors made by service providers and exonerate 
themselves from blame in the case of ID fraud. 
enforcement: Current privacy policies give users 
limited rights, for instance for opting in/out of certain 
secondary uses of their personal data. Effective 
enforcement of these terms is lacking. Users cannot 
check whether the service provider adheres to the 
policy agreed upon, nor can they see whether legal 
obligations are observed. It is even more difficult to 
verify whether user data has been shared with 
associates.
user support: The user has to cope with problems 
mentioned above on her own. She has to devise 
ways of managing her digital identities, assess pri-
vacy policies, assess the trustworthiness of interac-
tion parties and keep track of transaction histories 
using applications that offer very limited support for 
these mundane tasks.
proprietary protocols: Data exchange between 
enterprises is often done using proprietary protocols, 
although (XML) standardisation is under way. This 
makes the exchange of data between enterprises, 
e.g., for single sign-on, cumbersome to set up. This 
situation becomes more aggravated when non stan-
dard data are being used, such as encrypted data 
and credentials.
social sorting
Classifying and profiling 
groups of people in 
order to provide differ-
ent services, conditions 
or treatment.
Figure 2: PRIME high level architecture
 ⎋
PRIME toolbox
The PRIME toolbox is a 
collection of concepts 
and application mod-
ules developed in the 
PRIME project which 







The PRIME Middleware 
is the software which 
glues the components 
together. It provides 
interfaces for external 
and legacy applications 
to use the PRIME ar-
chitecture.
 ⎋
agement tasks to the PRIME Console and PRIME Middleware. The trustworthiness of the PRIME 
components should be maximised by technical means (e.g., cryptographic techniques) and non 
technical means (e.g., certification and assurance).
We will now explore Alice's ventures in the online wine business by going through six phases to 
illustrate online transactions from before entering the internet to becoming a frequent shopper and 
beyond.
phase 1: buyer beware
Transactions require a certain level of mutual trust between transaction partners. Each party has to 
be confident that the other will perform their contractual obligations, will not abuse one's vulnerabili-
ties, and that there are options for redress in case of breaches. In the offline world this confidence 
stems from factors such as the respect commanded by the brick and mortar that houses (com-
mercial and governmental) institutions and from honourable social institutions such as the legal 
system that acts as a safety net in case of conflicts. 
In the online world tangible signs of trustworthiness are absent to a large extent and therefore we 
have to rely on other signals for trustworthiness. It is relatively easy to create websites that resemble 
genuine ones. This method is therefore frequently employed by criminals for all kinds of fraud (in-
cluding ID theft and phishing attacks). Although people may believe a certain website to be genu-
ine, a reliable level of trustworthiness cannot be established. Assurance that a service provider is 
genuine and complies to regulations and policies can be provided by third parties (trust assurance), 
however, some users have difficulties in understanding the scope and value of these trust marks.
In addition, the communication channel needs to be trustworthy because communication can be 
intercepted, manipulated and suppressed. User provided data, such as credit card data can, when 
in the hands of the wrong people, have serious implications for the user. Integrity and confidentiality 
of both communication and data are therefore important requirements for online interactions. The 
users should substantially be able to trust the entire chain of entities involved in providing a service 
to be secure against intruders, eavesdroppers, etc - or better: not even need to rely on trust but 
stay in control. This calls for technical measures, such as, encrypted and properly authenticated 
communication. 
Additionally non-technical measures can increase user confidence that their interactions are safe.  
Transparency, i.e., providing clearly understandable information to the user on the data processing, 
is an example. Online processes – like shopping or simply gathering information – are currently 
rarely transparent and many users do not feel comfortable because of the technology involved in 
the interaction. Prospective customers often even have to guess or do not understand what the 
shopping process will look like when engaging in it.3 Improving the transparency of the processes 
and making clear why personal data are being collected and what happens with the data makes 
users feel more comfortable in online interactions and helps to build their trust.   
Based on her sister's recommendation, Alice decides that it may be worthwhile looking for wine at 
the CyberWinery. The store implements a number of measures that reassure Alice of its trustworthi-
ness. CyberWinery's home page shows a trust mark she is familiar with and that she considers 
trustworthy. The shop also turns out to be PRIME enabled, which means that she knows how the 
communication will work because it is well documented and she has experience with it. For the 
shop having a PRIME enabled customer means that it is able to check the validity of certain cre-
dentials provided by this customer by means of trusted third parties (see phase 3).
PRIME – Privacy and Identity Management for Europe
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3  Despite legal requirements (e.g., the e-Commerce Directive 2000/31/EC), many online shops still do not 
offer clear documentation of the shopping procedures. 
legal requirement:
justifiable parties
Personal data should 
only be accessible to 
entities with a legiti-
mate interest in the 
data, e.g., by consent 
of the individual, by 
legal obligation or for 
other legitimate pur-
poses. Service provid-
ers should implement 
technical measures to 
enforce this require-
ment, especially with 
respect to the use of 
personal data by third 
parties (for secondary 
uses). This requirement 
also implies that the 
user should be able to 
check the authenticity 
of the data requester.
⎈
PRIME Console
The PRIME Console is 
the interface to the 
user's identity man-
agement system. It 
allows users to create 
partial identities (pseu-
donyms), associate 
personal data to these 
identities, assists the 
user in understanding 
privacy policies, de-
cides on the basis of 
the user's preferences 
and allows the user to 
inspect the transaction 
history.   
 ⎋
data minimisation
From the perspective 
of the individual, this 
means disclosing as 
little personal data as 
possible, from the 
service provider's point 
of view it means only 
collecting personal 
data that are necessary 
for the purpose of the 
interaction or storing 
data only in ano-
nymised form. See also 
the (legal) requirement 
on the next page.
 ⎋
phase 2: pre-sales – starting from maximum privacy
Alice's online interest in white wine does not appear to be particularly private or sensitive, when 
compared with her visits to health insurance websites or medical websites that might reveal infor-
mation she wants to keep private. However, incorrect and damaging inferences may be drawn from 
Alice's wine interest when disclosed at the wrong place at the wrong time. Her search for wine dur-
ing working hours may reflect a drinking habit, even though it just happens to be that she is organ-
ising a cocktail party for a colleague. Alice is sensitive about disclosing data that may lead to the 
wrong conclusions, about leaving online trails about her online transactions and she may even be 
worried about identity fraud due to recent newspaper reports. She guards her private sphere and 
wants to remain as unobserved as possible. She adheres to the data minimisation ⎋ ⎈ principle 
and starts her online journeys from maximum privacy, choosing to disclose more personal details 
with her consent and according to the her own preferences.
Alice studies the company's general privacy policy. The shop has implemented the Article 29 work-
ing party's recommendation of layered policies [Art. 29 wp 2004]. The shop's home page shows 
the simple and short outline of the privacy policy and offers a click through to more detailed expla-
nations of the company's policies. The privacy policy states CyberWinery's intentions regarding the 
protection of personal data. It assures the user that the data obtained by the store during browsing, 
purchasing and later on for delivery (see phase 3) will be handled as stated in the policy and will 
only be made available on a need to know basis. Alice is assured for now that the shop meets 
some basic requirement (see justifiable parties ⎈). The policy also states that the shop will allow 
her to opt out of their direct marketing programme at all times if she cares to join it. It also explains 
that her IP address is only recorded for statistical purposes, but not for profiling her behaviour. 
IP addresses warrant caution because they are in many cases identifying data, albeit not very 
reliably. 4  They are like breadcrumbs left behind as a trail of the user facilitating linking her behaviour 
from one site to another. Due to the inadequacy of IP addresses as identifying data, they are 
sources of false conclusions about internet users. The principle of data minimisation can be applied 
to IP addresses as well. The shop should refrain from storing them unless there are legitimate rea-
sons to store them. Alice can use an anonymising service, such as TOR or AN.ON, to hide her IP 
address from the webshop. This would reduce her concerns about leaving IP breadcrumbs. The 
PRIME Middleware provides interfaces to such anonymising services which makes it easier for the 
user to use these services.
phase 3: ordering – informed consent and purpose limitation
Autonomy as a central concept implies that individuals should make their own choices and only be 
bound to contracts they knowingly and voluntarily enter into.5 As there usually is an asymmetry in 
both power and information to the detriment of the individual, it is reasonable to protect the individ-
ual in their relation with enterprises and governments. To this purpose regulation obliges service 
providers to state who they are and what their terms and conditions are, and what the effects of 
contracts they enter into are. This allows individuals to make informed choices and also provides 
them with information they need if they seek redress in case of contractual breaches, problems, 
and so forth.6 The information requirements also apply to the collection and use of personal data 
because this affects the individual's privacy.
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uted by ISPs.
5  Of course individuals also have legal obligations vested by the State they may not subscribe to voluntarily or 
enthusiastically, but even here they can voice their choices in elections.
6  The enterprise, on the other hand, also wants to have certainty that the customer meets her obligations, 




sure should be limited 
to adequate, relevant  
and non-excessive 
data. Implied in this 
requirement is that 
data needs to be pro-
vided on a need-to-
know basis and stored 
on a need-to-retain 
basis. This requires the 
requester to specify the 
purposes of collection, 
processing and storing 
of the data. Data 
should be deleted at 
the requester's end as 
soon as the specified 
purposes of data col-
lection are met. 
requirement:
user control and 
consent
In order to maintain the 
individuals' trust in the 
information society and 
guarantee their free-
dom of choice (auton-
omy), users should be 
able to control which 
personal data are given 
to whom and for what 
purpose. 
Exercising control re-
quires informed and 
uncoerced consent for 
specific uses, which 
may be revoked at a 




When Alice decides to purchase a box of white wines she must disclose some personal data in 
order to complete the purchase order. To determine which data are reasonable to disclose, she has 
to dig deeper in the shop's general privacy policy requiring serious effort. She has to consider the 
information the shop is obliged to provide about the purpose of data collection, the duration the 
data are kept, etc. On the basis of this information, she may decide that, in her opinion, certain data 
is excessive and she may decide to proceed, not to proceed, or provide false data. Assessing pri-
vacy policies is not easy in current environments. Many general privacy policies state the website's 
policy in lengthy difficult language that appears to show that the website really has considered all 
the intricacies of online transactions rather than providing the customer with relevant information. 
They are generally not written with the average user in mind. Although the statement 'we will share 
your data with our business partners' in itself is clear, its scope is not. There is often clearly room for 
improvement.
Consent is understood by many service providers as a necessary requirement for entering into con-
tracts, and for being allowed to collect and use personal data. It is usually implemented, if at all, by 
means of an 'I agree' button. The user has no choice but to accept the privacy conditions set by 
the service provider if she wants to enter into a contract. 
policies
PRIME replaces the 'take it or leave it' approach to privacy policies by a system of policy negotia-
tion. Both parties can express different kinds of policies relating to authorisations, data handling and 
preferences. The user is assisted (see human measure ⎈) by the PRIME Console which helps in 
setting personal preferences and requirements, in converting preferences from machine readable 
form to human readable form and vice versa, and in automatically negotiating the user's prefer-
ences with the other party. It supports the notion of user roles that allow the user to define policy 
sets (and their associated personal data) for various frequent uses. The PRIME Console therefore 
allows the user to delegate reaching a policy agreement to a digital assistant for common interac-
tions and assists the user in more complex interactions.
Alice, for instance, has a preference to reduce the chances of receiving unsolicited email. Therefore  
she wants to receive order confirmation through a temporary, 'disposable' mail address that retains 
mail only for one hour. Furthermore, she does not want to receive newsletters, unless the shop of-
fers some kind of incentive after her initial refusal, in which case the PRIME Console has to consult 
her. She also does not want to have her data distributed to business affiliates.
When the user enters a PRIME enabled website, she can activate the PRIME Console to take over 
all interactions relating to privacy policies or personal data. User applications may delegate identity 
management to the PRIME Console which then replaces the traditional webforms by a unified inter-
face to the user's identity management system. 
The PRIME Console keeps track of personal data relating to the user, her (negotiated) policies and 
service customisations, as well as of data disclosure to PRIME enabled services. The Console 
therefore keeps track of the history of the user's interactions. It can also poll services to provide 
information about the use of the data (and further disclosure to other parties) by this service pro-
vider, as well as the state of policy enforcement because the policies are associated with the data 
(sticky policies ⎋). This allows the user to maintain control over her own data and exercise her 
statutory rights7 to be informed about the data controller's use of her data  in a more effective way. 
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requirement: 
human measure
The user should be 
able to understand 
how she can exercise 
control over her per-
sonal data. Communi-
cation should therefore 
be in plain language 
using understandable 
concepts. 'Thingifica-
tion' should be used 
for necessary but 
complex notions, such 
as roles, rights and 
obligations (e.g., using 
business cards to rep-
resent data related to a 
role). Human-machine 
communication within 
and between contexts 
should be unambigu-
ous offering situational 
normality and predict-
ability. The interface 
should help to protect 
the user against iden-
tity attacks.
pseudonyms
A pseudonym is an 
identifier of a subject 
other than the sub-
ject's civil identity.
person pseudonym: 
A substitute or alias for 
a data subject's civil 
identity (name).
sticky policies
Sticky policies are a 
way to cryptographi-
cally associate policies 
to encrypted (personal) 
data. These policies 
function as a gate 
keeper to the data. The 
data is only accessible 






Data minimisation is furthermore facilitated by support for pseudonyms. In fact, anonymous, or 
pseudonymous interactions are the default within PRIME. In many cases a handle to the user (or 
pseudonym) known by both parties is sufficient for the interaction and for possible follow-up inter-
actions. For instance returning customers can be recognised on the basis of the user's pseudo-
nym, and also tailoring services to her needs and preferences is possible on the basis of a pseudo-
nym. PRIME supports different forms of pseudonyms with different characteristics with respect to 
linkability between the pseudonyms. 
claims
Using pseudonyms ⎋ instead of civil identities in transactions makes it more difficult to validate 
claims ⎋ or attributes.8 Yet, claims play an important role in minimising data disclosure because 
often it is not the identity of the user that matters but rather some attribute. For instance, the fact 
that Alice is over 16 years of age allows her to purchase alcohol, not the fact that she is called Alice. 
The fact that she can make the warranted claim that payment is assured, such as providing valid, 
non-revoked, credit card details, should be sufficient reason for CyberWinery to authorise shipment 
for a box of wine.
Claims in the real world can be certified by third parties. The State, for instance, offer certificates 
that a certain individual has a certain date of birth and lives at a certain address (passport, ID card, 
or driver's license). Online certifiers can, by means of cryptographic techniques (security tokens), 
vouch for certain claims in a secure manner that cannot be tampered with. PRIME offers extensive 
support for certified claims as well as for the creation of private credentials ⎋. Private credentials 
(or certificates) allow for releasing partial information contained in a master certificate, for example, 
that one is over 18 using the birth date attribute. In addition, it is possible, to provide encryptions of 
attributes of private certificates in the claim together with a proof that the encryptions actually con-
tain the third-party-endorsed attribute values and not any values put there by the claimant. Alice 
uses such a private certificate to prove that she is over 18.
What data Alice discloses when ordering her box of white wine depends on her preferences. She 
may want to reveal her real identity to CyberWinery, but she can also opt for a pseudonym. In the 
latter case the remainder of the shopping process will be slightly more complex than in the tradi-
tional setting where providing name, address and credit card data are sufficient to complete the 
transaction. If the winery makes use of a delivery service there is no need for them to have her ad-
dress for the purpose of delivery. Alice can provide CyberWinery with a security token that points to 
her account with the delivery service. Alternatively, she could send an encrypted token including her 
address to CyberWinery while only providing the delivery service with the decryption key to her ad-
dress. 
phase 4: after-sales and delivery – retaining control: policy enforcement
Some time after Alice placed her order she is not only curious to know when to expect her pur-
chase, but she is equally eager to know what data CyberWinery actually stored about her. She even 
had second thoughts about the shop having information about her at all. However, because the 
PRIME Console created a transaction pseudonym for her, she has trouble remembering which 
pseudonym was used for the transaction. 
This shows two core problems of (data protection in) the online world. The first is that (privacy 
savvy) netizens will accumulate many digital personae. They use avatars in online games and virtual 
realities, pseudonyms for other kinds of interactions and finally their civil identity for certain business. 
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8  If I know your name, I can try to get data about you through all sorts of channels, which is much more diffi-
cult if I only know you by transaction pseudonym ghT57897.
private creden-
tials (e.g., Idemix)
Private credentials are 
secondary credentials 
that are derived from a 
certificate issued on a 
different pseudonym of 
the same person. Mul-
tiple private certificates 
can be created from a 
single certificate that 
are neither linkable to 
each other nor to the 
issuance interaction in 
which the master cer-
tificate was obtained. 
See [Camenisch/
Lysyanskaya 2002] for 
details.
relationship pseudo-
nym: A pseudonym 
that is used in regard 
to a specific communi-
cation partner (e.g., 
distinct nicknames for 
different communica-
tion partners.
role pseudonym: A 
pseudonym that is 
chosen for the use in a 




donym that is used for 
a specific combination 
of a role and commu-
nication partner.
transaction pseudo-
nym: A pseudonym 
that is used for a spe-
cific transaction, i.e., 
for each transaction, a 
different pseudonym is 
used.
claims
A claim is a statement 
made by an entity (the 
claimant) about an-
other entity (the claim's 
object) to an entity or 




Unless there is a way to keep track of what each of these partial identities has done online, privacy 
protection is difficult in practice. The second problem is the lack of control on information once it 
has been released. Unlike goods, data cannot be reclaimed without the possibility that a copy is left 
behind in several possible places. This makes erasing traces hard, unless technology is brought to 
bear. 
PRIME supports the user in staying in control of her partial identities, also after data disclosure. It 
offers support for managing the (possibly) multiple pseudonyms that make up a partial identity and 
the revealed (certified) attributes of the user under these pseudonyms. It provides the user with 
three central means to accomplish this: tracking one's data trail, support for rights enforcement and 
policy enforcement. 
The PRIME Console's DataTrack function maintains a database of the personal data disclosed by 
the user. It provides a comprehensive overview of what personal data the user has released to 
whom, under which partial identity (pseudonym), when, and for what purpose (i.e. under what pol-
icy). The DataTrack therefore is an essential tool to keep track of one's digital personae.
The DataTrack also assists the user in enforcing her rights under the Data Protection Directive, for 
instance the right to get information about the data the service provider has about her, the right to 
correction and erasure. This functionality requires the implementation of PRIME Middleware at the 
user's side and the server's side. In cases of non-PRIME compliant service providers, the Data-
Track will provide the user with hints on how to correctly enforce her rights using legal means.
The most powerful function of the PRIME concept is the technical enforcement of agreed poli-
cies ⎈ on the service's side when equipped with PRIME enabled Middleware. The machine-
readable part of the sticky policies can be processed automatically by the PRIME server Middle-
ware. The system will detect the fulfilment of certain conditions that warrant action on the user's 
data. For instance, it may detect certain purposes of data collection having been fulfilled, e.g., the 
order was shipped and hence retaining the shipping address is no longer necessary. In line with the 
principle of data minimisation it will then be deleted. Or, if the user allows the service provider to 
store her home address for 6 months for personal offers, the expiry date is attached to the address. 
The server side PRIME Middleware will then automatically delete the home address at the due date.  
Ideally, the user's increased control over the data disclosure should lead to the disclosure of less 
personal data, but better quality data. As a side effect, certainty over policy enforcement may in-
crease the chances of the data being accurately provided instead of being fabricated. This not only 
is beneficial for the user, but also for the service provider. Automated policy enforcement is also 
advantageous for service providers because it facilitates compliance with internal policies as well as  
legal regulations.
phase 5: customer relationship – building the relationship
The quality of the CyberWinery's dry white wine appeals to Alice's taste and she returns to the 
shop to try out some of their red wines. She becomes a returning customer and before she realises 
it, she is a frequent customer (being the one with a big house, she hosts many family parties). 
Alicia's expertise as a wine buff turns out to be limited to white wine, so Alice decides that she may 
need the shop's recommendations on red and sparkling wines. She might also be interested in 
getting recommendations based on her previous purchases, similar to recommendations given at 
Amazon when accessing the site as a frequent customer. Both CyberWinery and Alice may benefit 
from this. Provided that Alice consented to such a service, CyberWinery could provide it.  The 
PRIME Console facilitates the means to opt-in and opt-out of such a recommendation service at 
will.
PRIME – Privacy and Identity Management for Europe
privacy-enhancing identity management white paper v3  9
requirement:
 policies and policy 
enforcement
Users should be able 
to express their privacy 
policies and prefer-
ences and negotiate 
the terms of data dis-
closure with service 
providers. The agreed 
upon policies should 
be strongly enforced by 
the identity manage-
ment systems on both 
sides of the transac-
tion.
⎈
She may do so if she is concerned about the store's ability to build detailed profiles about her, or 
even combine their data with those of other service providers to create a comprehensive picture of 
their customers' tastes, budgets and more. Although CyberWinery's recommendations may benefit 
from such detailed profiles, Alice wants to remain in control.
This desire to benefit from the advice provided by a service provider who is familiar with one's per-
sonal history on the one hand, and to remain relatively unknown on the other, leads to identity man-
agement issues. PRIME can help to address these. PRIME allows for a reduction of linkability of 
personal data if the user adopts different kinds of pseudonyms during the interactions. Alice can 
enter the store and identify herself with a role-relationship pseudonym for browsing and choosing 
items at CyberWinery that allows the shop to build a 'shopping' history for this pseudonym that is 
unlinkable to her real identity. Only when she decides to order, she switches to a transaction pseu-
donym that is only maintained for this specific transaction and is unlinkable to her role-relationship 
pseudonym. CyberWinery will retain the data associated to Alice's role-relationship pseudonym for 
further interactions. This does require a certain infrastructure to be in place that allows for a seam-
less identity switch at Alice's end – items placed in her shopping basket while browsing under her 
role-relationship pseudonym should be transferred to the real shopping basket she uses when 
checking out under her transaction pseudonym. The PRIME Middleware allows for this. CyberWin-
ery also has to be trustworthy not to associate the two pseudonyms behind the screens. 
There are other concerns during online interactions. What about Eve the notorious eavesdropper? 
Alice does not have to worry much about people acquiring her personal through interception of her 
communication because her personal data will be communicated using keys from the service pro-
vider and herself unavailable to Eve (public key encryption). Alice will also have some protection 
against 'man in the middle attacks', such as spoofed websites, because the PRIME Middleware will 
help her detect whether the site she visits is false, and again her personal data will be communi-
cated using keys from the genuine site and herself. 
phase 6: beyond being a connoisseur – Alice's other identities
It appears Alice has found a new hobby. She begins to like good food, good wine and matching 
company. She also appears to have a good nose and matching taste. She quickly gains a reputa-
tion as a connoisseur which also becomes apparent in online communities. In one of them, iCon-
noisseur, she gains a reputation of being a real expert under her pseudonym Malbecky. iConnois-
seur's reputation system is based on the member's rating of the amount and quality of others' con-
tributions. Alice receives 6 out of 10 corks in a whim. When she joins CyberWinery's forum, she 
learns that the quality of discussion is much lower here and she decides to contribute to improve 
the forum of her favorite webshop. However, as a newcomer she has trouble being heard. If only 
she could bring in her reputation.
This anecdote illustrates a common problem in the online world. Netizens build up reputations  
such as financial creditability, but also valuations and ratings by peers, such as iConnoisseur 'corks' 
are common. Transferring reputations from one context to the next, without linkability of the under-
lying partial identities is a feature that will prove valuable in online interactions.
PRIME can handle this kind of reputation transfer because reputations can be transferred into 
(anonymous) credentials. iConnoisseur can provide Alice with a credential that she can present at 
CyberWinery's forum. CyberWinery can check the validity of the credential, without being able to 
establish a link to Alice's pseudonym in the iConnoisseur site. 
Now that Alice has become a real connoisseur, she starts thinking about a career shift. She visits 
many vineyards in Spain, Italy, and France. She notices the steep price differences between Cy-
berWinery and local vineyards and sees a business opportunity. She and her bookkeeping genius of 
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a sister Alicia set up a small online wine shop which implements the PRIME Middleware to honour 
their customers' privacy. 
Their shop, MerchantSisters, flourishes, but one of their customers, identified as Bob13, plays a 
trick on them. He (or she) does not pay for a large shipment after a number of successful transac-
tions. The sisters want to claim payment but need a way to address Bob13 who does not respond 
to mail sent to the email address he provided.
PRIME allows for several new business mechanisms for privacy-enhanced services. The classical 
approach would be to use a payment system that adopts the first line responsibility for paying the  
service provider, which is how current services like credit cards deal with the issue. The problem 
introduced by Bob13 would not have occurred in this situation, or would have been put on the 
plate of the credit card company.
But with PRIME and its use of credentials and pseudonyms other approaches become feasible. 
Anonymity and pseudonymity have their limits. As users and service providers should be account-
able for their actions when they breach their contractual or legal obligations, also when they are 
surfing the web. Users can use pseudonyms and credentials to minimise data disclosure as long 
as there are mechanisms to reveal their civil identity when warranted, and under strict conditions. 
One of these conditions would be the use of a trusted third party that is contractually bound to 
reveal the civil identity of the user under certain circumstances (i.e., breach of contract between the 
MerchantSisters and Bob13 in our case). 
Another approach would go even further and have the trusted third party act as a court of arbitra-
tion. The contract between the MerchantSisters and Bob13 could contain a clause subjecting both 
parties to the rulings of this court. In many cases, alternative dispute resolution can work cheaper 
and faster than regular courts - also effectively lowering the threshold for making sustained claims. 
Involving the trusted third party as an intermediary preserves Bob13's privacy if the claims of the 
MerchantSisters prove to be unsubstantiated.
PRIME – Privacy and Identity Management for Europe




The user should be 
able to use a range of 
identifiers with varying 
degrees of observabil-
ity and linkability. This 
means users must 
have a choice to oper-
ate anonymously, 
pseudonymously or 
known. Users should 
also be able to use 
identities provided by 
public bodies or enter-
prises, as well as ones 
created by themselves, 
to be able to provide 
certainty about their 
identity to other entities 





The preceding pages have illustrated some of the (privacy) issues that individuals and businesses 
encounter in online interactions and the ways in which PRIME can offer privacy-enhancing solutions 
to these problems. The scenario introduced a limited application domain, online shopping. The 
PRIME concepts can also be used in other application domains, and also in other forms of com-
munication. Here are some examples.
The adoption of mobile phones and other mobile communication equipment is enormous. Because 
the location of these devices can be determined by telecommunications providers, this opens the 
way to a plethora of Location Based Services (LBS). One of these developments involves pull serv-
ices. Here, the user initiates a location determination which is then used to provide a location based 
service, such as pointing out the nearest train station or pharmacy. Push services are also possible. 
Here the service is activated without the individual's intervention. The location of the device triggers 
services the user subscribes to. For example a service could inform the user that one of their 
friends is nearby. These scenario's are likely to involve multiple service providers: the telecom infra-
structure provider, content service providers and telecom providers. It may be undesirable for these 
different providers to have access to the data generated by location based services. For instance, 
why should the telecom provider, let alone the infrastructure provider, know that Alice is looking for 
a pharmacy? PRIME technology can be used in LBS provisioning to offer ways to keep these vari-
ous service providers separate and thereby maintain the unlinkability of the user's personal data. 
This scenario is the basis of one of the PRIME application prototypes. 
Another important area where PRIME concepts can be of service is in citizen government interac-
tions. Current eGovernment services and identity management infrastructures are not exactly ideal 
from a privacy perspective. Adoption of PRIME technology in eGovernment would open ways for 
pseudonymous interactions while also allowing identified interaction, when required. This use runs 
parallel to Alice's shopping scenario. The added bonus is that the government can serve as a cre-
dential provider which would leverage privacy-enhancing technology from beyond eGovernment 
use to private sector use because there is a clear need for certified credentials here as well.
A third area where privacy issues can be tackled by PRIME technology are social networks. Profile 
sites, self-help discussion forums, and even virtual communities such as Second Life are environ-
ments where the users are very open about their interests, attitudes, concerns and behaviour. 
Though this is not without problems. The mechanisms controlling access to personal data are 
coarse in most cases. For instance, friends, and friends of friends, can have access to your profile 
data. It becomes increasingly clear that elaborate schemes are necessary to curb the spread of 
personal data, for instance by distinguishing types of stakeholders: friends, colleagues, sporting 
mates, etc. PRIME concepts can help here to define circles of users, decide who gets access to 
what data, offer encrypted data to be unencrypted only by authorised 'friends', and allows the user 
to see who had access to what data. 
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concepts and human computer interaction
The preceding sections have illustrated some of the PRIME concepts9 and some possible uses. 
Introducing and adopting privacy-enhancing identity management not only makes online life possi-
bly easier, for instance by enabling portable identities, it also means that individuals and businesses 
have to adopt different kinds of concepts and modes of operation. Data minimisation also means a 
change of attitude and culture. But beside this, relatively novel concepts such as roles, use con-
texts, credentials, and certificates are required. Although most people (implicitly) use the concept of 
social roles, for instance Alice is Alicia's sister, entrepreneur, tennis player, and possibly also mother, 
this use of role concepts to delineate access to personal data will be new to them. Yet these kinds 
of concepts are prerequisites for more elaborate privacy-enhancing identity management systems.
Privacy-enhancing identity management is not mature but a field in flux and it is still in the research 
phase. This means that, although the underlying technical mechanisms are relatively clear, the 
translation of these to concepts understandable for the normal user are not yet completed. In this 
respect, the user interface to the identity management system plays an important role because it is 
the user's instrument and shields the user from the technical intricacies. Much work in this field 
remains to be done on the level of requirements, the conceptual level, and in designing concrete 
interfaces. Some approaches in this field are also shown in the PRIME project. 
public awareness
Privacy issues abound, and to some extent solutions are also present. Yet the adoption of privacy-
enhancing solutions by businesses and individuals has so far lagged behind what may be neces-
sary to bring the Internet to full fruition. This is partly due to a lack of awareness among the general 
public of the risks involved in the unbounded disclosure of personal data. Reports in the popular 
press about privacy incidents involving personal data leaks from enterprise and government data-
bases, about profiling and mining an individual's past on profile sites by human resource depart-
ments and reports about ID theft surface more frequently. This may slowly increase the public's 
awareness that to be more careful with their personal data than they think. The PRIME project sees 
it as one of its tasks to raise public awareness with respect to privacy issues in a more systematic 
way. White papers such as this one, but also general public tutorials and promotional videos are 
part of this work package. 
economics
Businesses are utilizing data, in particular personal data, and so personal data routinely for daily 
operations, and as means of customising services, e.g. to employees and customers. Some of 
these information-processing practices are coming under increasing scrutiny leading to a call for 
better privacy management in organisations. Some processes may even become impossible to 
execute because of limitations imposed by privacy regulations and policies. In definitional terms a 
business process is a structured, measured set of activities designed to produce a specified output 
for a particular (internal or external) customer or market. The central question that concerns PRIME 
is how business processes are impacted by personal data, and how they can be reengineered to 
improve their privacy management. Realizing an adequate level of data protection requires the 
implementation of a set of organizational/procedural, e.g. segregation of duties and data handling 
procedures and technical measures. The latter are usually described as  ‘Privacy Enhancing 
Technologies’ (PETs). 
For the implementation of PETs solutions and PRIME in general, a increased level of maturity of the 
organization is often required. It is highly unlikely that an immature organization will implement PETs, 
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let alone that these organizations have any awareness of privacy protection. For privacy in particular 
we believe that there are two levels: the level where privacy is at best an ad hoc process, with local 
patches to solve local privacy problems; and the level where privacy is subject to a focused 
company policy.
The benefits offered by PETs can be quantitative or qualitative. If the application of PET leads to a 
reduction in costs or increase in revenues (e.g through a bigger market share), then the benefits can 
be measured and, therefore, are quantitative. Qualitative benefits are tricky to measure and hard to 
express in monetary terms; however, they can surpass the quantitative benefits. One example is the 
positive image generated by the application of PETs. 
Costs of PETs vary with the selected PETs option. For example if the option is data anonymization 
the emphasis lies on the one-off investments and less on the structural costs. When data are 
separated, different domains are created, the data model usually has to be modified, and there is 
more often a need for customization to implement the PET option. Encryption, for instance, is often 
cheaper than the application of biometrics with PKI.
reaching out
Finally, in order for privacy-enhancing identity management to be adopted on a large scale not only 
requires that individuals take notice of the technology. But it also requires service providers to 
implement the necessary software. Businesses and governments will only do so if they see an 
advantage for doing this. PRIME investigates and reports on business opportunities, costs and 
benefits in order to show the viability of adopting privacy-enhancing identity management. It allows 
businesses and governments, for instance, to comply with data protection legislation more easily. It 
may also reduce their liability because storing less personal data means less vulnerability to attacks 
by ID thieves. Not asking for excessive data and offering ways for pseudonymous transactions may 
also increase the quality of the data they have about their customers. 
Another prerequisite for large scale adoption is interoperability. PRIME, or for that matter any identity 
management system, stands no chance unless it allows interoperability with existing back-end 
applications and other identity management systems. This calls for standardisation. The PRIME 
project is therefore actively involved with standardisation bodies, such as W3C and the relevant 
ISO/IEC Working Groups.
your move
The present white paper has given a glimpse of PRIME project's vision, goals and the way of 
achieving these. Having read this, it will be clear that much work remains to be done. To achieve 
the goals set out we need your input, so we kindly invite you to join the discussion and help us 
bring privacy-enhancing identity management closer to reality. 
Please visit us online at http://www.prime-project.eu
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appendices 
appendix 1 – requirements for Identity Management Systems
At the start of the PRIME project in 2004, the following principles were adopted as guidelines for 
the design and implementation of privacy-enhancing identity management solutions.
The PRIME design principles 
• Design must start from maximum privacy
• Explicit privacy governs system usage
• Privacy rules must be enforced, not just stated
• Privacy enforcement must be trustworthy
• Users need easy and intuitive abstractions of privacy
• Privacy needs an integrated approach
• Privacy must be integrated with applications
The PRIME project continues to adhere to these principles. Yet in the current white paper we have 
approached requirements for privacy-enhancing identity management from a slightly different angle 
combining the PRIME principles with requirements brought forward by other initiatives. This has 
resulted in the following list of requirements.
user control and consent
In order to maintain the individuals' trust in the information society and guarantee their freedom of 
choice (autonomy), users should be able to control which personal data are given to whom and for what 
purpose. Exercising control requires informed and uncoerced consent for specific uses, which may be 
revoked at a later date, by the individual.
justifiable parties
Personal data should only be accessible to entities with a legitimate interest in the data, e.g., by consent 
of the individual, by legal obligation or for other legitimate purposes. Service providers should implement 
technical measures to enforce this requirement, especially with respect to the use of personal data by 
third parties (for secondary uses). This requirement also implies that the user should be able to check 
the authenticity of the data requester.
data minimisation
Personal data disclosure should be limited to adequate, relevant  and non-excessive data. Implied in 
this requirement is that data needs to be provided on a need-to-know basis and stored on a need-to-
retain basis. This requires the requester to specify the purposes of collection, processing and storing of 
the data. Data should be deleted at the requester's end as son as the specified purposes of data col-
lection are met. 
policies and policy enforcement
Users should be able to express their privacy policies and preferences and negotiate the terms of data 
disclosure with service providers. The agreed upon policies should be strongly enforced by the identity 
management systems on both sides of the transaction. 
human measure
The user should be able to understand how she can exercise control over her personal data. Commu-
nication should therefore be in plain language using understandable concepts. 'Thingification' should be 
used for necessary but complex notions, such as roles, rights and obligations (e.g., using business 
cards to represent data related to a role). Human-machine communication within and between contexts 
should be unambiguous offering situational normality and predictability. The interface should help to 
protect the user against identity attacks.
multiple identities and accountability
The user should be able to use a range of identifiers with varying degrees of observability and linkability. 
This means users must have a choice to operate anonymously, pseudonymously or known. Users 
should also be able to use identities provided by public bodies or enterprises, as well as ones created 
by themselves, to be able to provide certainty about their identity to other entities and therefore promote 
accountability when required. 
 PRIME – Privacy and Identity Management for Europe
16 privacy-enhancing identity management white paper v3
appendix 2 – PRIME walkthrough in more detail
In this appendix we provide a somewhat more detailed walk-
through of the network interaction in the shopping scenario.10 We 
focus on the exchange of claims and credentials. The walk-
through starts when Alice orders her box of wine. In the se-
quence diagram, this is represented as Alice requesting access to 
a resource. 
This triggers the webstore's access control mechanism. This 
component responds by sending a request for a claim satisfying 
the condition in the Data Handling Policy (DHP) for the requested 
resource. In our case the DHP could be that the customer needs 
to show that she is over 18 years of age. She is offered the choice 
to provide proof by means of a valid OECD ID document and an 
encrypted copy of her name and address as appearing on the 
OECD approved ID document. Alternative she can present a 
pseudonym used in previous transactions. 
Alice's PRIME Middleware Access control compo-
nent will in turn respond to this claim request. It 
will make a release decision whether the re-
quested proof will be provided to the service pro-
vider. If the service provider is unknown to Alice's 
PRIME Console. It may issue a request for the 
shop to prove that it meets certain requirements, 
such as complying to certain standards. This op-
tional request is similar to the shop's request for proof of Alice's legal age. The proof will be verified 
and logged.
If Alice's PRIME Access control module decides that 
the requested proof can be released, the claim and 
evidence will be communicated to the service provider. 
Concretely, the OECD ID passport may be instantiated 
to a Swiss passport, and the address on an OECD 
Photo ID may be instantiated to the address as ap-
pearing on Alice's Swiss driver's license. These data, 
together with a DHP' proposed by Alice's system that 
states the conditions under which the data is dis-
closed will be sent to the service provider. The DHP' 
may for instance be that the encrypted name and address may 
be provided to the shipping service for the purpose of being 
able to ship the order and the data may be retained for a 
maximum of three years or whatever is legally obligatory. Alice's 
PRIME Console will next log which data has been disclosed 
under which conditions. 
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 data handling policy'
         Enck(name, address) to Shipping_Com-
pany(Purpose: service), 
Max_data_retention(3 years, or legal maximum)
 access requires:
 age > 18 ← OECD_Passport AND 
         Enck(name, address) ← OECD_PhotoID 
 OR
 pseudonym ← CyberWinery
At the service provider's side similar events happen. The data are verified, and if approved access is 
granted to the service and the claim stored. 
In order for Alice's system to make access and data 
disclosure decisions, it has to make use of various 
sources as depicted below. It will, for instance, make 
use of ontologies to decide that Alice's passport is an 
instance of an OECD passport. It will consult Alice's 
access control policies to decide what kind of condi-
tions Alice may want to have associated to the data. 
It will access the credential storage to retrieve the 
data to be disclosed. And it will store all sorts of log-
ging data in the transaction history.
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